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ABSTRACT 
  Thirty years ago, the international community took a hard line 
against international parental kidnapping. The Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction allows parental 
child abduction only in rare circumstances, such as when returning 
the child would create a “grave risk” of harm. Recently, mothers who 
have abducted their children when fleeing domestic violence have 
successfully pled this grave-risk exception, demonstrating the 
Convention’s relevance to the realities of domestic violence. This Note 
welcomes that development, but argues that the rights of left-behind 
parents, who increasingly are fathers, must also be taken into 
account. Left-behind fathers, whether guilty of domestic violence or 
not, face significant challenges litigating their cases in the United 
States, and an overbroad interpretation of the grave-risk exception 
would only heighten these challenges. To remain fair, the Convention 
can—and must—consider the rights and realities of left-behind 
fathers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “child abduction” conjures up haunting images of 
strangers kidnapping children from their parents. Yet far more 
prevalent are cases in which the children’s parents are themselves the 
abductors.1 Parental child abduction, also called family abduction or 
parental kidnapping, occurs when one parent takes a child across 
state lines and retains the child without the consent of the other 
parent.2 Often, parental abductors do not just cross state lines; many 
take their children across international borders. 
The problem of international parental kidnapping is particularly 
acute for the United States. More children are abducted into or out of 
the United States than any other party3 to the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention),4 the 
international treaty that governs child abductions between 
contracting states. In 2009, 1,194 children were abducted from the 
United States, and 486 children were abducted into the United States 
from abroad.5 It is thus unsurprising that cases of international 
parental kidnapping frequently seize headlines.6 
When the Convention was drafted, the paradigmatic abductor 
was thought to be a noncustodial father, and issues of domestic 
 
 1. In 1999, there were 56,500 reported cases of family child abduction in the United 
States, whereas there were only 12,100 cases of nonfamily child abduction. Andrea J. Sedlak, 
David Finkelhor, Heather Hammer & Dana J. Schultz, National Estimates of Missing Children: 
An Overview, NISMART (Off. Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, D.C.), Oct. 2002, at 6, available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196465.pdf. 
 2. See id. at 4 (defining “family abduction”). 
 3. NIGEL LOWE, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, A STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003 UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 
OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: PART II—
NATIONAL REPORTS 479 (2007 update) (2008), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/
abd_pd03ef2007.pdf. 
 4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98. 
 5. These numbers represent only abductions between the United States and other 
contracting states. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CHILD ABDUCTION 68 (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2010ComplianceReport.
pdf. 
 6. For example, the case of Sean Goldman, who was abducted to Brazil by his mother five 
years ago and only recently returned to his father in the United States, attracted considerable 
media attention. See, e.g., Sharon Cotliar & Dom Phillips, ‘I Want My Son Back,’ PEOPLE, Mar. 
23, 2009, at 137; Kirk Semple & Mery Galanternick, Boy and Father Back in U.S. After 
Reuniting in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at A27. 
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violence had not yet become salient in the public eye.7 Presently, 
however, the majority of international parental child abductors are 
custodial mothers, many of whom are fleeing from or claim to be 
fleeing from violent relationships.8 When petitioned to return their 
children pursuant to the Convention, these fleeing mothers frequently 
seize upon Article 13(b) of the Convention, which allows a judge to 
deny return when it would pose a “grave risk” of harm to the child.9 
This invocation of Article 13(b) has proven effective. Recent case law 
has begun to reflect an interpretation of Article 13(b) that is sensitive 
to domestic-violence victims and their children—even when the 
violence was directed solely at the fleeing mother, not the child.10 
Similarly, scholars have urged an interpretation of Article 13(b) that 
protects those fleeing from violent relationships.11 As a result, the 
Convention, through the interpretation of Article 13(b)’s grave-risk 
exception, has largely—though not entirely—adapted to the realities 
of interparental violence.12 
 
 7. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 8–9 (1999) (citing studies from the 1970s and 1980s 
indicating that between 71 and 75 percent of abductors were male); Merle H. Weiner, 
International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
593, 611–14 (2000) (noting that the media and legislators did not become aware of the role of 
domestic violence in motivating abductions until the early 1990s). 
 8. Nigel V. Lowe & Katarina Horosova, The Operation of the 1980 Hague Abduction 
Convention—A Global View, 41 FAM. L.Q. 59, 67–68 (2007) (noting that 68 percent of all 
abductors are mothers). 
 9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 10. See, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming a finding of 
grave risk of harm when the violence was directed solely at the abducting mother, not the child); 
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding grave risk of 
harm when the violence was directed solely at the abducting mother and only threats were made 
against the child); Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–54 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding 
grave risk of harm based on spousal abuse). 
 11. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their 
Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529, 532–35 (2004) 
(arguing that a narrow interpretation of the grave-risk exception does little to protect domestic-
violence victims or their children); John Caldwell, Child Abduction Cases: Evaluating Risks to 
the Child and the Convention, 23 N.Z. U. L. REV. 161, 164 (2008) (noting the trend among “a 
number of legal academics” who advocate for a broader interpretation of Article 13(b)); 
Weiner, supra note 7, at 651–62 (arguing that a broader interpretation of the grave-risk 
exception would better protect domestic-violence victims). 
 12. This Note uses the phrase “interparental violence” interchangeably with “domestic 
violence” to refer to violence directed against the adult parent, not the child. Although cases in 
which physical violence is directed toward the child could also be termed “domestic violence,” 
those cases more clearly fall within the ambit of Article 13(b) and are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
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Yet fleeing parents and their children are not the only 
constituency whose rights merit protection in abduction cases. 
Parents whose children are abducted also enjoy rights under the 
Convention. Whether or not these left-behind parents, who 
increasingly are fathers,13 are guilty of domestic violence, they are 
entitled at least to a fair hearing to seek the return of their children—
especially given that the outcome of a Convention hearing will 
determine the key question of where custody is litigated. Left-behind 
fathers seeking to litigate their cases in the United States currently 
face considerable logistical challenges, including access to counsel. 
These challenges will be magnified if Article 13(b) is interpreted too 
broadly. If the grave-risk exception is not carefully interpreted, 
Convention disputes will acquire some of the features of custody 
disputes, such as inquiry into the child’s best interests, that allow 
gender stereotypes to color outcomes. Blurring the standard 
appropriate for custody cases—best interests of the child—with the 
one reserved for Convention cases—grave risk of harm—will only 
undermine the rights of left-behind fathers. 
Part I of this Note introduces the purposes of the Convention, 
the requirements for a prima facie case of abduction, and possible 
defenses. Part II describes how domestic violence, even if directed 
solely at the fleeing parent, may be grounds for a refusal to return the 
child under Article 13(b) of the Convention because of the well-
known effects of exposure to domestic violence on children. It also 
suggests that fleeing mothers should be subject to a slightly lighter 
evidentiary burden when making claims under Article 13(b). Part III, 
however, balances the rights of left-behind fathers against the rights 
of fleeing mothers and stresses that left-behind fathers face 
formidable logistical challenges that will be exacerbated if Article 
13(b) is interpreted too loosely. Gender bias evident in custody 
disputes and in Supreme Court decisions threatens to afflict 
Convention cases if Article 13(b) is not interpreted carefully. 
Fortunately, the domestic abduction framework offers solutions to 
ward off this danger and protect the rights of left-behind fathers. 
Recent interpretations of Article 13(b) have rightly recognized 
the gravity of interparental violence by adapting the Convention to 
provide refuge for fleeing mothers and their children. Any 
interpretation of Article 13(b), however, must take into account the 
 
 13. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
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precarious and unique situation of left-behind fathers. The rights and 
realities of left-behind fathers as well as those of domestic-violence 
victims must be protected in international family-law disputes if the 
Convention is to remain both relevant and fair. 
I.  STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CONVENTION 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, which has been incorporated into federal law,14 has 
two key objectives: to deter child abduction and to provide for the 
swift return of abducted children.15 To serve these aims, the 
Convention creates a “qualified summary-return mechanism,”16 
whereby judges must order the return of abducted children unless any 
of five exceptions apply. The most relevant exception here—and the 
one that is most commonly pled worldwide17—is the grave-risk 
exception under Article 13(b). The Convention’s purpose and design 
illustrate the need to interpret Article 13(b) judiciously in order to 
protect the rights of both fleeing mothers and left-behind fathers. 
A.  Purpose of the Convention 
Before the Convention entered into force, it was exceedingly 
difficult to recover a child abducted internationally by a parent.18 
 
 14. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006). 
Although the Convention was drafted in 1980, and ratified by the United States in 1986, it did 
not become effective until 1988, when Congress incorporated it into federal law. JAMES D. 
GARBOLINO, INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY CASES: HANDLING HAGUE CONVENTION 
CASES IN U.S. COURTS 14 (3d ed. 2000). 
 15. Specifically, the Convention’s twin objectives are “[t]o secure the prompt return of 
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and “[t]o ensure that 
rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected 
in the other Contracting States.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, supra note 4, art.1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98; see also ELISA PÉREZ-VERA, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, EXPLANATORY REPORT (1981), reprinted in 3 ACTES ET 
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION: ENLÈVEMENT D’ENFANTS ¶ 25, at 426, 432 
(1982), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf (identifying the two objectives of 
the Convention as the prevention of abduction and the swift return of children). The Pérez-
Vera Report is the highly influential official report that accompanied the Convention. See 
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 
10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986) (identifying the Pérez-Vera Report as the “official history and 
commentary on the Convention and . . . a source of background on the meaning of the 
provisions of the Convention”). 
 16. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29. 
 17. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 161. 
 18. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 3. 
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Even if the child could be located in a foreign country, courts in that 
country were reluctant to order the child’s return without lengthy 
proceedings, which made it less likely that return would actually 
benefit the child.19 In a world in which individual mobility and 
international marriage were on the rise,20 it soon became apparent 
that an international, cooperative response would be necessary to 
combat the growing problem of parental child abduction. 
The Convention provides that response by creating an 
international legal framework common to all contracting states21 that 
both deters parental abduction and ensures the swift return of 
children who are wrongfully abducted.22 The Convention is rooted in 
the fundamental idea that abduction harms children.23 Abducting 
children uproots them from familiar surroundings,24 puts them at risk 
of serious emotional and psychological problems,25 and strains or even 
breaks their bonds with their left-behind parents.26 The effects of 
abduction, unfortunately, outlive the abduction itself; even if 
returned, many abducted children continue to have significant 
emotional and physical problems.27 The left-behind parents of 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. At the time of publication of this Note, there are eighty-two contracting states to the 
Convention. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Dec. 18, 2010). 
 22. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(3)–(4), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11601(a)(3)–(4) (2006) (recognizing that international cooperation is necessary to deter 
international child abduction and that the Convention provides a framework for swift return); 
supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 23. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1) (“The 
international abduction or wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-being.”); 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, pmbl., 
1343 U.N.T.S. at 98 (“The States signatory to the present Convention . . . [d]esiring to protect 
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention . . . 
[h]ave resolved to conclude a Convention . . . .”). 
 24. TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 131 (2005). 
 25. The Human and Social Cost of International Parental Child Abduction, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/solutions/solutions_3872.html (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 26. Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental 
Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 49, 57 (2008). For this reason, the action of abduction itself can be considered a form of 
domestic violence. Id. at 74. 
 27. Geoffrey L. Greif, A Parental Report on the Long-Term Consequences for Children of 
Abduction by the Other Parent, 31 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEV. 59, 67–70 (2000) 
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abducted children similarly suffer emotional stress and turmoil,28 
which can continue long after the children are returned.29 As 
Congress recognized when it incorporated the Convention into 
domestic law, only international cooperation can effectively minimize 
these harms.30 
The interests of children thus lie at the heart of the Convention.31 
Yet its novelty is that the Convention seeks to respond to the 
interests of children collectively.32 Instead of allowing a detailed best-
interests-of-the-child analysis in every case, the Convention permits 
only the narrow inquiry of whether the child’s removal was 
wrongful.33 If the abduction was wrongful, and if the abducting parent 
fails to prove an exception that justifies the abduction,34 the child will 
be returned forthwith to her country of habitual residence so that the 
merits of the underlying custody dispute can be litigated there.35 
Thus, Convention cases are not custody cases.36 Rather, the 
Convention establishes a legal mechanism for determining where the 
 
(describing various postrecovery symptoms of abducted children); id. at 67 (finding that 42 
percent of abducted children in the sample continued to have “significant problems” over time). 
 28. MAUREEN DABBAGH, THE RECOVERY OF INTERNATIONALLY ABDUCTED CHILDREN 
14 (1997) (describing the intense emotional strain under which left-behind parents labor); 
MARILYN FREEMAN, REUNITE INT’L, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: THE EFFECTS 29–
31 (2006), available at http://www.reunite.org/edit/files/Library - Reunite Publications/
Effects Of Abduction Report.pdf (describing the symptoms of left-behind parents, ranging from 
physical sickness to shock to suicidal thoughts). 
 29. Greif, supra note 27, at 68 (finding that some left-behind parents’ feelings of rage, 
depression, and anxiety continue for up to a decade after the abduction). 
 30. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(3)–(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(3)–
(4) (2006). 
 31. The preamble to the Convention states that “the interests of children are of paramount 
importance in matters relating to their custody.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, supra note 4, pmbl., 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98. 
 32. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, 
¶ 24, at 431 (“[T]he struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must 
always be inspired by the desire to protect children . . . .”). 
 33. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99 (defining 
wrongful removal). 
 34. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 35. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29–30; Linda Silberman, Patching Up the 
Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and a Suggestion for 
Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 44 (2003). 
 36. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006); 
PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 19, at 430. 
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ultimate question of custody will be decided.37 By permitting the 
judge in a Convention proceeding to decide only the limited question 
of wrongful removal, rather than the broader question of custody, the 
Convention prevents judges hearing abduction cases from allowing 
their own subjective beliefs—a product of their own culture, 
community, and country—to influence decisions that are better made 
in the child’s country of habitual residence.38 The Convention’s sharp 
focus on the sole question of wrongful removal was necessary to 
change the mentality of judges accustomed to employing an 
individualized, best-interests-of-the-child approach whenever 
confronted with disputes involving children.39 
B.  Structure and Operation of the Convention 
The Convention provides a civil remedy that enables left-behind 
parents to obtain access to,40 or secure the return of, their wrongfully 
removed or retained children.41 As long as the left-behind parent has 
custodial rights and did not consent to the child’s relocation, 
demonstrating a wrongful removal is not typically burdensome. First, 
either a state or federal court42 must determine where the child was 
“habitually resident” at the time of the removal.43 Second, the court 
must determine whether the removal breached the custody rights of 
 
 37. See Silberman, supra note 35, at 44 (“The Convention remedy can best be thought of as 
a ‘provisional’ remedy because it does nothing to dispose of the merits of the custody case. 
Additional proceedings are generally contemplated in the state of the child's habitual residence 
after the child is returned.”). 
 38. PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 22, at 431. 
 39. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29. In contrast, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children . . . the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, 
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added). 
 40. This Note focuses on the return of children under the Convention and therefore does 
not discuss rights of access. In any case, the vast majority of petitions under the Hague 
Convention are for return, not access. See Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that in 
2003 there were 1369 return applications and only 250 access applications). 
 41. The term “children” is defined as minors less than sixteen years of age. Once a child 
turns sixteen, the Convention no longer applies. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99. 
 42. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006). 
 43. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 3(a), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98. Though the term “habitually resident” was left undefined by the 
Convention, an extensive national and international jurisprudence has identified several factors 
relevant to its determination. See KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING 
& EXPLOITED CHILDREN, LITIGATING CHILD ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 12–13 (2007) (identifying factors that determine habitual residence). 
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the left-behind parent and whether the left-behind parent was 
exercising those rights at the time of the removal.44 If the left-behind 
parent proves these elements by a preponderance of the evidence,45 
then the removal was wrongful. The burden then shifts to the 
abducting parent to show why the court should nonetheless deny the 
petition for the child’s return. 
Faced with a prima facie case for return, the abducting parent 
may plead any of five “discretionary exceptions” to resist the return 
of the child:46 (1) the child has become “settled” in her new location 
after at least a year;47 (2) the left-behind parent has consented to or 
acquiesced in the removal;48 (3) the child, of sufficient age and 
maturity, objects to the return;49 (4) the return would violate human 
rights and fundamental freedoms;50 and (5) the return would expose 
the child to “grave risk” of harm.51 Even if an abducting parent 
successfully pleads an exception, discretion ultimately rests with the 
judge whether to deny the return, allowing the child to stay.52 Thus, 
although return is mandatory if the abducting parent cannot show 
that an exception applies, return is discretionary when the abducting 
parent successfully pleads an exception. All of the exceptions were 
drawn narrowly so that they would not undermine the Convention’s 
aim of returning children.53 
 
 44. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 3(a)–(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99. 
 45. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(e)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A). 
 46. See Jeanine Lewis, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction: When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Impact the Goal of 
Comity, 13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 391, 408 & n.153, 409 (2000) (noting that the phrase 
“discretionary exception[]” accurately describes what are often termed “defenses” under the 
Convention). 
 47. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 12, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100. 
 48. Id. art. 13(a), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 49. Id. art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 50. Id. art. 20, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 51. Id. art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 52. See PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 113, at 460 (“[T]he very nature of these exceptions 
gives judges a discretion—and does not impose upon them a duty—to refuse to return a child in 
certain circumstances.”). 
 53. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–38 (stating that the defenses were 
“restrictively drafted” so that the Convention’s return mechanism would function effectively). 
The existence of these exceptions demonstrates that, although deterring abduction is in the 
collective interest of children, abduction may be justified, or return unacceptably harmful, in 
some individual cases. See PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 25, at 432 (“[I]t has to be admitted 
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The last of these exceptions, contained in Article 13(b) of the 
Convention, is commonly referred to as the grave-risk exception. 
Article 13(b) states that a child’s return may be denied if “there is a 
grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”54 Fleeing parents who allege domestic violence in 
Convention proceedings most often rely on Article 13(b),55 and thus 
its interpretation is key in balancing the rights of fleeing mothers and 
left-behind fathers. 
II.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER THE CONVENTION 
Worldwide, Article 13(b) is the most litigated of the 
Convention’s five exceptions.56 At first blush, the disagreement about 
the proper interpretation of Article 13(b) is somewhat curious: 
Congress, the State Department, and the Convention’s drafters all 
intended that Article 13(b) be interpreted narrowly.57 Indeed, the 
13(b) exception “was not intended to be used by defendants as a 
vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests”;58 it could 
only be met by a grave risk, such as that implicated by child sexual 
abuse.59 Otherwise, by providing an overly broad exception to the 
Convention’s rule of return, Article 13(b) would undermine the 
 
that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do 
either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected.”). 
 54. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 55. Roxanne Hoegger, What if She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague 
Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 
187 (2003). 
 56. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 161. 
 57. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4) 
(2006) (“Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the 
Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the 
Convention applies.”); Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986) (“[I]t was generally believed that courts 
would understand and fulfill the objectives of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the 
exceptions . . . .”); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–38 (noting that Article 13(b) 
was drafted in an intentionally restrictive manner). 
 58. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,510. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[t]he exception ‘is not license for a court in the 
abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest.’” Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 
F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 59. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,510. 
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Convention’s twin goals of deterring child abductions and returning 
children swiftly.60 
The reason for the uncertainty surrounding Article 13(b) 
becomes clearer, however, when one recognizes that the restrictive 
approach to the grave-risk exception was adopted when the 
prototypical abductor was believed to be a noncustodial male, 
frustrated at being denied custody of his children.61 This belief does 
not appear to reflect current reality. In 2003, the latest year for which 
comprehensive statistics are available, 68 percent of all abductors 
were female, and 85 percent of female abductors were primary or 
joint-primary caretakers.62 At the same time, there is now both public 
acknowledgement of and empirical support for the fact that some 
custodial mothers who abduct their children are motivated by fears of 
domestic violence.63 Although the reasons for this demographic shift 
remain unclear,64 the drafters of the Convention likely did not 
imagine this pronounced change in the profile of the average 
abductor.65 Indeed, the Convention itself, its implementing legislation, 
and the guidelines from the State Department do not mention 
domestic violence.66 Thus, fleeing parents, typically mothers,67 are 
 
 60. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–39 (noting the difficulties in 
drafting and interpreting Article 13(b) due to the sometimes-competing interests of children and 
caretakers). 
 61. See id. at 8–9 (citing studies from the 1970s and 1980s indicating that between 71 and 75 
percent of abductors were male). 
 62. Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 67–68. 
 63. See Sudha Shetty & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Adult Domestic Violence in Cases of 
International Parental Child Abduction, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 115, 120 (2005) (noting 
that one-third of all Convention cases made reference to familial violence, and 70 percent of 
those cases included reference to adult domestic violence); Weiner, supra note 7, at 611–14 
(noting that the media and legislators started to become aware of the role of domestic violence 
in motivating abductions, perhaps as a result of a greater public awareness of domestic-violence 
issues generally, as early as 1993). 
 64. See, e.g., BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 10 (suggesting that the declining 
percentage of male abductors could be due to the increased success of males who seek custody 
rights, and who are thus no longer motivated to abduct, or to the stronger deterrent effect that 
the Convention has on fathers). 
 65. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 162. 
 66. Admittedly, at least one delegate who helped draft the Convention considered the 
situation of mothers fleeing domestic violence. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 136 
(describing the United Kingdom delegate’s observation that the final phrase of Section 13(b) 
was important to protect fleeing mothers). Yet this was not the paradigmatic case that the 
Convention sought to address, and the Convention did not deal explicitly with the problem. See 
id. at 135–36 (noting various other situations in which the final clause of Article 13(b) could be 
invoked). 
BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF 1/14/2011  1:02:54 PM 
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1193 
asking courts to apply Article 13(b) to a situation that the Article’s 
framers did not consider. Under these circumstances, disagreement as 
to the application and scope of Article 13(b) is unsurprising. 
The demographic shift in the identity of the typical child 
abductor has prompted many scholars to call for an interpretation of 
Article 13(b) that protects domestic-violence victims and their 
children.68 And though they have not done so uniformly, many courts 
have recognized that sufficient evidence of domestic violence—
directed solely at the fleeing parent—can be grounds to deny a 
petition for return.69 These outcomes find support both in policy, 
given the well-known effects of interparental violence on 
children,70and in the text of the Convention, in the “psychological 
harm” component of Article 13(b).71 Despite what some scholars have 
suggested,72 it is unnecessary to venture into novel interpretations of 
Article 13(b) to meet the needs of domestic-violence victims. The 
wiser course is for courts to seize upon the psychological harm 
component of Article 13(b), as many have done, and to lighten, if 
they have not already, a component of the evidentiary burden for 
fleeing parents attempting to show grave risk. Doing so will allow 
 
 67. Either parent in an intimate relationship can perpetrate domestic violence. But the 
common case under the Convention is violence by fathers against mothers, and thus this Note 
focuses on that scenario. See Alanen, supra note 26, at 78 (noting that men who abduct their 
children “[r]arely, if ever” claim domestic violence under the Article 13(b) grave-risk 
exception). 
 68. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 532–35 (arguing that a narrow interpretation of 
Article 13(b) does little to protect domestic-violence victims or their children); Caldwell, supra 
note 11, at 164 (noting that “a number of legal academics” advocate for a broader interpretation 
of Article 13(b) that would protect domestic-violence victims); Weiner, supra note 7, at 704 
(noting that courts have failed to appreciate how witnessing domestic violence should qualify as 
“grave risk”). 
 69. Compare Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460–61 (1st Cir. 2000) (ordering the return of 
a child partly on the ground that the father’s physical and verbal abuse was directed at the 
mother, not the child), with Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (denying the 
return of a child based on a grave risk of physical or psychological harm when the physical and 
verbal abuse was directed primarily at the mother, not the child), Van De Sande v. Van De 
Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–72 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding a grave risk of harm when the violence was 
directed solely at the abducting mother and only threats were made against the child), and 
Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–54 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding a grave risk of 
harm based on spousal abuse). 
 70. See infra Part II.A. 
 71. See infra Part II.B. 
 72. Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following 
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 348–52 (2008). 
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domestic-violence victims to continue to use Article 13(b) effectively, 
while not impinging on the rights of left-behind fathers. 
A.  Domestic Violence and its Effects on Children 
It is widely accepted that interparental violence creates an 
unhealthy environment for a child73 and heavily influences custody 
determinations.74 But given that the Convention does not decide 
issues of custody and provides only narrow discretionary exceptions 
to the rule of return,75 it is not self-evident that interparental violence 
should qualify as a grave risk of psychological harm under Article 
13(b). Yet the enduring effects of interparental violence on children, 
as well as the overlap between interparental violence and child abuse, 
demonstrate that credible evidence of such violence meets the high 
standard of grave risk. 
Exposure to interparental violence has profound effects on 
children’s development.76 Almost one hundred published studies have 
demonstrated links between childhood exposure to interparental 
violence and problematic behavior, either as a child or later as an 
adult.77 Children exposed to interparental violence tend to exhibit 
higher rates of depression, anxiety, aggression, and fighting than 
children who are not exposed.78 Those children may also have a 
difficult time focusing on schoolwork, thus hindering their intellectual 
 
 73. See B.B. ROBBIE ROSSMAN, HONORE M. HUGHES & MINDY S. ROSENBERG, 
CHILDREN AND INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF EXPOSURE 17–18 (2000) 
(describing the negative effects of interparental violence on the emotional climate of the 
family). 
 74. Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 26 (2002) (noting that 
“many states have a rebuttable presumption against an award of joint custody if domestic 
violence has occurred, and many of these states also presume that an award of sole custody to a 
perpetrator of domestic abuse is not in the child’s best interests”). 
 75. See supra notes 33–35, 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 76. Katherine M. Kitzmann, Noni K. Gaylord, Aimee R. Holt & Erin D. Kenny, Child 
Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 339, 347 (2003) (“Overall, the results of the current meta-analysis provided robust 
evidence that exposure to interparental aggression is associated with significant disruptions in 
children’s psychosocial functioning, at least in the short term.”). 
 77. Shetty & Edleson, supra note 63, at 126 (listing studies documenting the present and 
future effects of domestic violence on children). 
 78. John W. Fantuzzo & Wanda K. Mohr, Prevalence and Effects of Child Exposure to 
Domestic Violence, FUTURE CHILD., Winter 1999, at 21, 27; Kitzmann et al., supra note 76, at 
345 (noting that “about 63% of child witnesses . . . far[ed] more poorly than the average child 
who had not been exposed to interparental violence”). 
BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF 1/14/2011  1:02:54 PM 
1206 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1193 
development.79 Even infants who witness interparental violence may 
exhibit measurably higher levels of stress, as well as severe 
attachment problems to the abused parent—typically the mother.80 
Moreover, violence in a male’s family is the single strongest 
predictor of abuse in later adult relationships.81 The cycle-of-violence 
theory posits that children who are exposed to violence are more 
likely to perpetrate violence themselves.82 Specifically, scholars have 
demonstrated that exposure to violence during childhood predicts the 
development of negative ideas about gender and interpersonal 
violence, which in turn predicts the use of violence by boys when they 
become adults.83 As a result, battering rates are three times higher 
among men who witnessed interparental violence as children.84 
Finally, children may carry with them the effects of violence in 
the form of anxiety and distress long after the violence has subsided.85 
Witnessing interparental violence in childhood has been linked to 
poorer adult social adjustment and higher rates of adult depression.86 
Thus, merely removing the child from the violent situation may not 
be sufficient to end its harmful effects. 
In addition to the well-documented psychological effects of 
abuse, there is “considerable overlap” between interparental violence 
and child abuse.87 One analysis, which collected studies reviewing the 
relationship between partner-directed and child-directed violence, 
 
 79. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 78, at 27. 
 80. PETER G. JAFFE, NANCY K. D. LEMON & SAMANTHA E. POISSON, CHILD CUSTODY 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (2003) (noting the 
physical responses of infants who witness domestic violence); G. Anne Bogat, Erika DeJonghe, 
Alytia A. Levendosky, William S. Davidson & Alexander von Eye, Trauma Symptoms Among 
Infants Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 109, 119–21 (2006) 
(finding that nearly half of infants exposed to intimate partner violence had at least one trauma 
symptom). 
 81. Deborah Reitzel-Jaffe & David A. Wolfe, Predictors of Relationship Abuse Among 
Young Men, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 99, 108 (2001) (“[S]tudies have for many years 
found violence in one’s family of origin to be the most consistent indicator of abuse in men’s 
adult relationships.”). 
 82. JAFFE ET AL., supra note 80, at 27. 
 83. Reitzel-Jaffe & Wolfe, supra note 81, at 108. 
 84. Id. at 101. 
 85. JAFFE ET AL., supra note 80, at 29–30 (noting that even if there is no threat of present 
violence, “any association with the past . . . can create significant anxiety and distress” among 
children who have witnessed domestic violence). 
 86. Id. at 26–27. 
 87. Anne E. Appel & George W. Holden, The Co-Occurrence of Spouse and Physical 
Child Abuse: A Review and Appraisal, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 578, 596 (1998). 
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found an average co-occurrence of 41 percent;88 other studies have 
found a co-occurrence of between 30 percent and 60 percent.89 Thus, 
when one parent violently abuses the other, there is a strong 
possibility that the child is also subject to abuse—a fact that some 
courts have seized upon to buttress their refusals to return children 
under Article 13(b).90 
Courts must make individualized findings in each Convention 
case as to whether there is “specific evidence” of grave risk of harm to 
the child upon return;91 they may not rely merely on studies and 
statistics to make Article 13(b) determinations. Nonetheless, the data 
suggest that when there is evidence of serious interparental violence, 
judges are on firm ground in refusing returns based on grave risk. 
Article 13(b) remains a high bar. But the documented effects on 
children of witnessing interparental violence and the overlap of 
interparental violence and child abuse allow courts, when presented 
with sufficient evidence, to confidently refuse return even when the 
violence is strictly interparental.92 
B.  The Meaning of Psychological Harm under Article 13(b) 
Even though the Convention does not use the phrase “domestic 
violence,” its language is broad enough to meet the needs of 
domestic-violence victims and their children. Article 13(b) states that 
the return of a child may be denied if “[t]here is a grave risk that [the 
child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”93 It is 
the psychological harm component that provides the strongest textual 
support for protecting victims of violence and their children. 
 
 88. Id. at 581. 
 89. Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134, 136 (1999). 
 90. E.g., Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057–58 (E.D. Wash. 2001) 
(“Spousal abuse, found by the Court in this case, is a factor to be considered in the 
determination of whether or not the Article 13(b) exception applies because of the potential 
that the abuser will also abuse the child.”). 
 91. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 92. E.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding grave risk and refusing 
to return a child based partially on the grounds that “children are at increased risk of physical 
and psychological injury themselves when they are in contact with a spousal abuser” and that 
there is a well-documented overlap between partner and child abuse). 
 93. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101 (emphasis added). 
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Many courts have recognized the crucial link between exposure 
to domestic violence and psychological harm. In Baran v. Beaty,94 the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s refusal to return a child to 
Australia, even though there was no evidence that the abusive father 
had ever intentionally harmed the child.95 That the father had been 
verbally and physically abusive toward the mother was sufficient to 
show that there would be a grave risk of harm if the child were 
returned.96 Similarly, in Van De Sande v. Van De Sande,97 the Seventh 
Circuit reversed a lower court’s return order, noting that the lower 
court had been “unduly influenced” by the fact that most of the abuse 
was directed at the mother, not the children.98 Finally, in Walsh v. 
Walsh,99 the First Circuit found that the father’s history of domestic 
violence constituted a grave risk of harm, even though the child was 
only witness to, not the target of, the violence.100 
Nonetheless, as Professor Merle Weiner observes, “[s]ome courts 
are unable to appreciate the connection between domestic violence 
against the parent and the physical or psychological well-being of the 
child.”101 Weiner posits that one solution is to breathe life into the 
“intolerable situation” language of Article 13(b).102 She notes that 
U.S. courts focus unduly on the restrictive grave risk of physical or 
psychological harm components of Article 13(b)103 and urges courts to 
seize upon the pliable “intolerable situation” language to deny return 
in cases of interparental violence.104 
This argument misses the mark. First, there is a risk that 
“intolerable situation,” a phrase whose content is still undefined by 
American case law, will create an unacceptably broad exception to 
the Convention. In some foreign jurisdictions, courts have interpreted 
 
 94. Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 95. Id. at 1346. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 98. Id. at 570. 
 99. Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 100. Id. at 220. 
 101. Weiner, supra note 72, at 356; see also id. at 356 n.94 (citing federal district court cases 
in which domestic violence was considered irrelevant to the question of grave risk). 
 102. Id. at 345–52. 
 103. Id. at 345–46. It is widely acknowledged that courts tend to conflate the Article 13(b) 
exceptions. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 139 & n.32 (noting that courts often 
combine the Article 13(b) exceptions and citing examples). 
 104. Weiner, supra note 72, at 356. 
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“intolerable situation” in so sweeping a manner105 as to undercut the 
Convention’s purpose of deterring child abduction by providing for 
the swift return of abducted children.106 In the same vein, a recent 
revision to Swiss law107 defines “intolerable situation” quite broadly, 
allowing Swiss judges to refuse return when it is “manifestly not in the 
child’s best interests,”108 a standard that does not rise to the level of 
grave risk.109 This best-interest standard permits an abducting parent 
to use newfound ties in the destination country—such as having 
recently given birth or gotten married—to resist a return order.110 
Such a broad interpretation of Article 13(b) allows courts to consider 
 
 105. See, e.g., P.F. v. M.F., [Jan. 13, 1993] S.C. (Ir.) (unreported), available at http://www.
hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0102.htm (finding that a father’s financial irresponsibility was evidence 
that the children would be placed in an intolerable situation if returned, and denying the father’s 
petition partly on that ground); In re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), [1994] 2 Fam. 349 
(U.K.) (noting that a disruption in the children’s customary lifestyle could result in an 
intolerable situation). 
 106. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 153 (criticizing an impermissibly broad 
interpretation of “intolerable situation”). 
 107. Loi fédérale sur l’enlèvement international d’enfants et les Conventions de La Haye 
sur la protection des enfants et des adultes [LF-EEA] [Federal Act on International Child 
Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and Adults] Dec. 21, 
2007, RS 211.222.32 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/211_222_32/index.html, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/211.222.32.en.pdf (unofficial English translation). 
 108. Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on International Child Abduction, 4 J. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 139, 162 (2008). 
 109. The new legislation alters the traditional, restrictive grave-risk-of-harm inquiry by 
defining “intolerable situation” according to a broad three-part conjunctive test: whether a 
return would be “manifestly [contrary to] the child’s best interests,” whether the abducting 
parent cannot “reasonably be required” to return to the country of origin, and whether 
temporary “placement in foster care [would be] manifestly [contrary to] the child’s best 
interests.” See id. at 162–63 (reprinting the text of the Swiss legislation). This definition of 
“intolerable situation” has the potential to expand broadly the scope of Article 13(b). First, 
according to Professor Andreas Bucher, an advocate of the law, the legislation allows judges to 
take into account the newfound ties of a fleeing parent to the destination country. Id. at 158. But 
considering these ties cuts against the spirit of the Convention, which allows judges to evaluate 
only whether a child has become well settled, and then only after one year. See Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 12, 1343 
U.N.T.S. at 100 (establishing that judges can consider the child well settled in the new 
environment if more than a year passed between the abduction and the filing of the Convention 
petition). Second, Bucher argues that taking a child away from the primary caretaker and 
placing the child in foster care for the purposes of litigating a custody dispute could only be 
considered in “utterly exceptional circumstances.” Bucher, supra note 108, at 159. Thus, under 
Bucher’s analysis, the third part of the “intolerable situation” test rings hollow, given that 
temporary placement in foster care would almost always be manifestly contrary to the child’s 
best interests. 
 110. Bucher, supra note 108, at 158. 
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factors better suited to a custody dispute, entailing far-reaching 
consequences for left-behind fathers.111 
Second, even if fears of a loose interpretation of “intolerable 
situation” are overblown,112 it is simply not necessary to parse the 
language of the Convention to protect children from the effects of 
interparental violence. The Convention explicitly allows judges to 
refuse returning a child to a situation in which there is a grave risk of 
psychological harm.113 If courts fail to appreciate the link between 
interparental violence and psychological harm to children, then there 
is a need for more education on the psychological effects caused y 
exposure to interparental violence, not a need for creating a new 
exception to the Convention or invigorating a seldom-used one.114 
Victims of spousal abuse, in addition to providing evidence of the 
abuse itself, must emphasize the abundant scientific literature 
describing the psychological harm to children who are exposed to 
interparental violence. As previously noted, several circuits have 
 
 111. See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 112. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 140 (noting that Article 13(b) is 
“without doubt the most strictly regulated of all of the exceptions and has been upheld in only a 
handful of cases” (footnotes omitted)). In addition, contracting states evidenced their intent to 
interpret Article 13(b) narrowly by recently rejecting a Swiss amendment that would have 
broadened the Convention’s Article 13(b) exceptions. See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, REPORT ON THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE PRACTICAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 19 OCTOBER 1996 ON JURISDICTION, 
APPLICABLE LAW, RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF 
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ¶¶ 163–165, 
at 45–46 (2007), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_2006_rpt-e.pdf (“A majority 
of experts also insisted that the Article 13(1) b) exception should be interpreted narrowly and 
cautioned that the Swiss proposal created an additional ground for refusal . . . .”). Notably, the 
Swiss Parliament later adopted a national law similar to what Switzerland proposed. Weiner, 
supra note 72, at 339, 343. 
 113. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 114. The Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention, at its 
most recent meeting of contracting states, feared “that the Swiss proposal created an additional 
ground for refusal.” See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
supra note 112, ¶ 165, at 46 (emphasis added). Although it is not typically necessary to rely on 
the “intolerable situation” language of Article 13(b) in interparental violence cases, courts could 
rely on this language in at least some other cases. See id. ¶ 166, at 46 (acknowledging that the 
phrase “intolerable situation” could be used in cases “where the return of a child would not 
necessarily create a grave risk, but where it would still be inappropriate to order the return”). 
Some authors have suggested that an intolerable situation could arise, for example, in the case 
of separation of siblings. Weiner, supra note 72, at 348. 
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refused to return children based on interparental violence.115 Courts 
should draw upon the “psychological harm” language in the 
Convention to recognize the effects of interparental violence on 
children. 
C.  An Adjustment to the Fleeing Parent’s Evidentiary Burden 
In addition to appreciating the link between interparental 
violence and psychological harm to children, an adjustment to the 
fleeing parent’s burden to show grave risk under Article 13(b) would 
ensure that proving grave risk is not unduly burdensome. In some 
circuits, fleeing parents who claim to have been victims of domestic 
violence must show by clear and convincing evidence that the country 
to which the child would be returned is unable or unwilling to protect 
the child.116 Thus, to succeed under Article 13(b), domestic-violence 
victims must gather evidence showing that the country of origin 
would fail to protect the child upon return. Though technically dicta, 
this formulation has been repeated by other circuits.117 The effect of 
this requirement is to make it more difficult for fleeing parents to 
establish Article 13(b) exceptions.118 At first glance, this approach 
seems reasonable: it reflects the view that American courts trust—or 
ought to trust—that courts in other contracting states are equally 
capable of protecting children, unless proven otherwise.119 Such trust, 
it might be said, lies at the heart of international comity. 
Yet this evidentiary requirement is unnecessary and 
burdensome, and it does little to further international comity. First, as 
other circuits have recognized, neither the Convention nor its 
 
 115. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
 116. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that the abductor must show 
that courts in the country of habitual residence are unable or unwilling to protect the child); 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e believe that a grave risk of 
harm for the purposes of the Convention can exist in only two situations. First, there is a grave 
risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution 
of the custody dispute . . . . Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or 
neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual 
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate 
protection.” (second emphasis added)). 
 117. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting with approval the 
requirement that the abductor must show that the country of habitual residence is unable or 
unwilling to protect the child). 
 118. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 (“When we trust the court system in the abducted-from 
country, the vast majority of claims of harm [under Article 13(b)] . . . evaporate.”). 
 119. See id. (“[W]e acknowledge that courts in the abducted-from country are as ready and 
able as we are to protect children.”). 
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implementing legislation mandate the examination of foreign legal 
systems.120 Second, requiring the abductor to put forth such evidence 
creates difficult problems of proof, as the evidence of systemic 
deficiencies is most readily available in the country from which the 
abductor fled.121 And third, finding grave risk without inquiring into 
the capacities of foreign legal systems does not offend any principle of 
international comity. As Judge Richard Posner has written, “If 
handing over custody of a child to an abusive parent creates a grave 
risk of harm to the child, . . . the child should not be handed over, 
however severely the law of the parent’s country might punish such 
behavior.”122 To acknowledge that even the most robust and well-
resourced legal systems suffer from enforcement gaps is not to 
denigrate mutual trust and comity; it is simply to embrace reality.123 
Thus, a fleeing parent who seeks to demonstrate that returning a child 
would create a grave risk of psychological harm should not carry the 
additional burden of demonstrating systemic deficiencies. 
D.  An Example of How Article 13(b) Protects Domestic- 
Violence Victims 
By recognizing the well-known effects of interparental violence 
on children and by relieving the fleeing parent of the burden to show 
systemic weaknesses, courts have successfully used Article 13(b) to 
deny petitions for return in cases of interparental violence. Contrary 
to what some scholars have urged,124 it has not been necessary to 
create new or dust off seldom-used exceptions to the Convention. 
The Eleventh Circuit case of Baran v. Beaty exemplifies how Article 
13(b) is sufficiently protective of domestic-violence victims.125 
 
 120. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining “to impose on a 
responding parent a duty to prove that her child’s country of habitual residence is unable or 
unwilling to ameliorate the grave risk of harm”); Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 
571 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o define the issue not as whether there is a grave risk of harm, but as 
whether the lawful custodian’s country has good laws or even as whether it both has and 
zealously enforces such laws, disregards the language of the Convention and its implementing 
statute; for they say nothing about the laws in the petitioning parent’s country.”). 
 121. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1348. 
 122. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. 
 123. Id. at 570–71 (“There is a difference between the law on the books and the law as it is 
actually applied, and nowhere is the difference as great as in domestic relations.”). 
 124. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
 125. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1352. 
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An Australian father, Mr. Baran, petitioned for the return of his 
son Samuel from the United States.126 Ms. Beaty, Samuel’s mother, 
conceded that she had wrongfully removed Samuel but argued that 
returning him would pose a grave risk under Article 13(b).127 Beaty 
claimed that Baran had a severe alcohol problem and that he 
physically and verbally abused her during her pregnancy with Samuel 
and, after she gave birth, in Samuel’s presence.128 
The district court sided with Beaty, ruling that returning Samuel 
to Australia would pose a grave risk of harm.129 Baran appealed, 
arguing that he had never abused Samuel, and that grave risk could 
only be shown if there was evidence of violence toward the child, not 
just the mother.130 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It found that the 
evidence of psychological and physical harm to Beaty created a grave 
risk of harm to Samuel upon his return.131 The court explicitly noted 
that it was irrelevant that there was no evidence of intentional abuse 
of Samuel;132 the effects of witnessing his mother’s abuse would have 
created a grave risk if Samuel had been returned to his father. In 
making its decision, the court did not find it necessary to read deeply 
into the “intolerable situation” language of 13(b).133 And the court did 
not require Beaty to adduce evidence regarding the state of social 
services in Australia, recognizing that so doing would create difficult 
problems of proof.134 Accordingly, Baran v. Beaty exemplifies how 
Article 13(b) has been used appropriately to protect domestic-
violence victims, and how the Convention has adapted to fit the 
modern-day context. 
III.  LEFT-BEHIND FATHERS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Although Article 13(b) was drafted when most child abductors 
were fathers and before domestic violence was a salient public 
concern,135 it has been interpreted to protect victims of domestic 
 
 126. Id. at 1341–42. 
 127. Id. at 1345. 
 128. Id. at 1345–46 (quoting Baran v. Beaty, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1270–71 (S.D. Ala. 
2007)). 
 129. Baran, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–76. 
 130. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1346. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 106–07. 
 134. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1348. 
 135. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
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violence and their children. When interpreting Article 13(b), 
however, it is crucial to bear in mind that there is another 
constituency whose rights merit protection—left-behind fathers.136 An 
overbroad interpretation of Article 13(b) would not only undercut 
the Convention’s twin goals of deterring child abduction and swiftly 
returning abducted children,137 it would also jeopardize the rights of 
left-behind fathers. 
Left-behind fathers face significant challenges litigating in the 
United States under the Convention, both in securing legal 
representation and in litigating their cases once they have 
representation. Allegations of domestic violence exacerbate these 
challenges. As many left-behind fathers contend, once domestic-
violence allegations are made against them, their “rights and 
remedies seem abruptly to dissolve as system actors become 
complacent or even facilitate the kidnapper.”138 The odds, they feel, 
are against them from the moment of the abduction. 
The disadvantages faced by left-behind fathers will become only 
more pronounced if Article 13(b) is not interpreted with care. An 
unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b)—one that is not grounded in 
specific evidence of a grave risk of psychological harm upon return—
will increase the potential for Convention proceedings to assume the 
attributes of traditional custody contests. Inquiries regarding the 
child’s best interests or who would be the better custodial parent, 
irrelevant in Convention disputes, would become relevant if not 
determinative.139 This risk is real: at least one contracting state has 
 
 136. This discussion focuses on left-behind fathers, not left-behind parents generally, 
because the majority of left-behind parents are fathers. Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 67. 
Further, Article 13(b) exceptions based on interparental violence are almost exclusively 
asserted by mothers against fathers—meaning that the parties faced with countering domestic-
violence allegations are predominantly left-behind fathers. See Alanen, supra note 26, at 78 
(noting that men who abduct their children “[r]arely, if ever” claim domestic violence under the 
Article 13(b) grave-risk exception). This does not mean that men are not victims of domestic 
violence, but only that they do not make allegations of domestic violence in Convention cases. 
 137. See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 138. Alanen, supra note 26, at 73. There is evidence that some fathers feel this way in the 
national context, as well. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS 
ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA 159 (2008) (describing how, in the domestic context, some fathers feel 
that once an allegation is made, they “can do little to protect themselves from the resulting 
quagmire of investigations from law enforcement and social service agencies”). 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. Grave-risk inquiries and custodial 
determinations are markedly distinct. See Foster v. Foster, 654 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (W.D. Pa. 
2009) (“It is important to stress that, under the Hague Convention, I am not charged . . . with 
resolving issues germane to a custody dispute. If I were, this would be in basketball parlance, a 
BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF 1/14/2011  1:02:54 PM 
2011] RELEVANCE AND FAIRNESS 1215 
passed legislation that broadens the Article 13(b) inquiry to include at 
least some elements of a custody determination.140 And as some 
circuit court decisions demonstrate, it is only through careful and 
constant policing of Article 13(b)’s interpretation by district courts 
that the lines between Convention disputes and custody disputes 
remain distinct.141 
Admittedly, because Convention proceedings do not determine 
custody, left-behind fathers who do not prevail in their Convention 
cases can still litigate to obtain custody of their children. Yet the 
stakes for a left-behind father in a Convention case are nonetheless 
high. When a judge refuses a child’s return on grounds of grave risk of 
harm due to domestic violence—whether warranted or not—a left-
behind father will have to fight for custody rights in a foreign 
jurisdiction that has already found allegations against him credible. 
Whatever difficulties the father faced during the Convention 
proceeding will only become more formidable during a subsequent 
custody proceeding. For instance, although a foreign left-behind 
father is eligible for free legal assistance in Convention cases, he is 
not eligible for such assistance in custody cases.142 Further, a left-
behind father litigating for custody in the United States will confront 
stereotypes that continue to mark traditional custody disputes—
stereotypes that the Supreme Court has failed to roundly reject.143 A 
finding of grave risk in a Convention proceeding can thus have a great 
impact on the ultimate custody determination. 
Although interpreting the grave-risk exception under Article 
13(b) to protect victims of domestic violence is a welcome 
development, an overly broad interpretation threatens to undermine 
the legitimate rights and interests of left-behind fathers, whether or 
 
‘slam dunk.’”). Yet if these inquiries are blurred, evidence that is relevant to custody would also 
be admitted to resist return petitions. 
 140. New Swiss legislation allows for a refusal of return when return would be “manifestly 
not in the child’s best interests” and permits an abducting parent to use newfound ties in the 
abducted-to country to resist a return order. Weiner, supra note 72, at 343; see also supra notes 
111–14 and accompanying text. 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 197–208. 
 142. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 1626.10(e) (2009) (establishing that a foreign national who files a 
Convention petition is eligible for legal aid), with id. § 1626.5 (2009) (setting forth an exhaustive 
list of categories of foreign nationals who are eligible for legal aid services, which does not 
include foreign parents seeking custody). 
 143. See infra Part III.B.2–4. 
BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF 1/14/2011  1:02:54 PM 
1216 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1193 
not they are guilty of domestic violence.144 To strike the proper 
balance, judges must be sensitive to the precarious situation of left-
behind fathers. In this vein, judges should consider the domestic legal 
framework that governs child abductions between U.S. states—a 
framework that preserves the rights of left-behind fathers more fully 
than the Convention.145 
A.  Logistical Hurdles of Litigating a Convention Case in the  
United States 
1. Challenges Faced by All Left-Behind Parents.  Foreign left-
behind parents litigating their Convention cases in the United States 
face considerable cost-related and logistical challenges. Although 
Article 26 of the Convention provides that contracting states cannot 
require the left-behind parent to pay legal fees incurred as a result of 
litigation under the Convention,146 the United States has opted out of 
this provision.147 Left-behind parents without means to pay legal fees 
in Convention cases in the United States must rely on legal aid or 
other pro bono legal services,148 which may, but are not required to, 
assist them.149 Although cost may be an issue for both parents, it is the 
left-behind parent who bears the initial burden of filing a petition in 
court through an attorney. And the left-behind parent must do so 
within one year; otherwise, he opens himself to an argument that the 
 
 144. Left-behind fathers who are correctly found to present a grave risk to their children 
may not evoke sympathy, but even convicted batterers deserve to “have a competent court 
determine the nature and extent of the parent-child relationship.” Alanen, supra note 26, at 84. 
This determination could range from court-mandated anger-management therapy to a 
termination of parental rights. Id. Custody rights, which come in various shapes and sizes, do 
not automatically dissolve simply because one parent is abusive. Id. 
 145. See infra Part III.C. 
 146. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 26, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102. 
 147. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 8(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(1) 
(2006) (establishing that the United States bears no responsibility for the legal costs of the left-
behind parent). 
 148. See id. § 8(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(2) (requiring that left-behind parents bear the 
costs of litigating Convention cases, unless legal aid covers the costs). 
 149. Publicly funded legal aid services are permitted to represent litigants under the 
Convention, even if they are not American citizens. But legal aid services are not required to do 
so. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.10(e) (2009). 
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child has become “settled in its new environment,”150 making his case 
that much more difficult.151 
That the United States has entered a reservation to Article 26 
and otherwise has no comprehensive legal aid system152 places 
applicants whose children have been abducted into the United States 
at a serious disadvantage. This disadvantage is exacerbated by the 
fact that half of all incoming cases in 2009 originated in countries with 
modest levels of economic development. In 2009, there were 324 new 
incoming Convention cases, representing 486 children abducted into 
the United States.153 Of these 324 cases, 156 (or 48 percent) originated 
from countries in which the per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is less than twelve thousand dollars.154 At the same time, the 
cost of litigating a Convention case can range from forty-five to fifty-
five thousand dollars, not including the cost of an appeal.155 Thus, 
most applicants from countries with lower levels of economic 
development will simply be unable to litigate their cases without 
 
 150. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 12, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100. Often called the “well-settled defense,” this exception is only 
available in cases in which the child has been removed for more than a year. KILPATRICK 
STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 41. Courts have determined that tolling begins when the 
petition is filed in court, not merely when it is submitted to the Central Authority, making the 
task of obtaining counsel to file the petition within one year from the date of abduction an 
urgent matter. See Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007) 
(establishing that tolling begins when the petition is filed in court). 
 151. These cases are more difficult due to both the availability of the “well-settled defense” 
and the fact that fleeing parents must only demonstrate that the child has become well-settled 
by a preponderance of the evidence. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(e)(2)(B), 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). 
 152. Silberman, supra note 35, at 60. 
 153. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, supra note 5, at 68. 
 154. Countries that are contracting states to the Convention, that were sources of new 
incoming Convention applications in 2009, and in which the GDP per capita is less than twelve 
thousand dollars, include Argentina, Belize, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Macedonia, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Turkey, Venezuela, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Compare id. 
(listing all contracting states that filed new incoming applications in 2009), with Social 
Indicators: Indicators on Income and Economic Activity, UNITED NATIONS STAT. DIVISION, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/inc-eco.htm (last updated June 2010) 
(listing the GDP per capita of all countries in 2008). 
 155. Telephone Interview with Stephanie P. Cassano, Former Legal Projects Coordinator, 
Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children (Nov. 23, 2009). For four and a half years, 
Stephanie Cassano was responsible for placing incoming Convention cases with pro bono 
attorneys in the United States. This figure represents Cassano’s conversations with pro bono 
coordinators at large law firms accustomed to taking on Convention cases. 
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substantial legal assistance.156 International family law expert Stephen 
Cullen remarks that obtaining competent, affordable legal 
representation is the biggest challenge that left-behind parents face 
when litigating their cases in the United States.157 The lack of legal aid 
can dishearten a left-behind parent158 and has been the subject of 
criticism from abroad.159 Attempts to increase funding to legal aid 
organizations and private attorneys willing to take on Convention 
cases have stalled in Congress.160 
Thus, although the American media seizes upon high-profile 
cases in which parents have shelled out hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to litigate their Convention disputes,161 the more typical case 
involves a left-behind parent from a country outside the United States 
who cannot afford to obtain American counsel.162 In contrast, many 
other contracting states, comparable to the United States in economic 
development, offer free, comprehensive legal assistance for left-
behind parents. For example, the United Kingdom, despite having 
entered a reservation to Article 26, provides counsel through legal aid 
without means or merits testing.163 Similarly, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Ireland provide free legal aid to Convention applicants.164 
 
 156. In the author’s experience, the vast majority of applicants from Mexico and South 
America are unable to pay for legal services. 
 157. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen, Principal, and Kelly A. Powers, Associate, 
Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. (Nov. 4, 2009). Cullen has been litigating international child 
abduction cases for twenty years and is attorney adviser to the United States Delegation to the 
Hague Special Commission. 
 158. FREEMAN, supra note 28, at 42. 
 159. See, e.g., BLANCA GÓMEZ BENGOECHEA, ASPECTOS CIVILES DE LA SUSTRACCIÓN 
INTERNACIONAL DE MENORES: PROBLEMAS DE APLICACIÓN DEL CONVENIO DE LA HAYA DE 
25 DE OCTUBRE 1980, at 128–30 (2003) (noting that the combination of a lack of comprehensive 
legal aid and the Article 26 reservation is particularly problematic for applicants whose children 
are abducted into the United States). 
 160. For example, a bill introduced in the House in 2008 would have created a program to 
provide funding to those willing to take on Convention cases. At the time of publication of this 
Note, there has been no action upon this bill since July 28, 2008. International and Parental 
Child Abduction Remedies Assistance Act, H.R. 6095, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (2008). 
 161. The case of Sean Goldman, who was only recently returned to his father in the United 
States after a five-year retention in Brazil, attracted considerable media attention. See supra 
note 6. Sean’s father reports spending over four hundred thousand dollars in litigation costs. 
BRING SEAN HOME FOUND., http://bringseanhome.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (soliciting 
donations to cover Sean’s father’s legal costs). 
 162. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. 
 163. Silberman, supra note 35, at 60 & n.126 (noting the Article 26 reservation of the United 
Kingdom); International Parental Child Abduction: United Kingdom, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/country/country_533.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) 
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Once they secure legal representation, left-behind parents may 
continue to find themselves at a disadvantage due to geography. It 
can be difficult, costly, and sometimes impossible for left-behind 
parents to travel to the United States for a Convention hearing. 
Although the presence of the left-behind parent is not required by the 
Convention, attorneys typically try to have their client travel to the 
United States if possible. As Cullen remarks, “[w]e always try 
somehow to get the [left-behind parent] here. But the judges are not 
just used to doing this all under the affidavit. In most other countries, 
it’s all done by affidavit.”165 The United States is indeed an outlier in 
this regard. In the United Kingdom and New Zealand, for instance, it 
is “commonly accepted” that evidence will be submitted in affidavit 
form, and left-behind parents would “certainly not be expected to 
travel abroad” for the purposes of a Convention hearing.166 American 
judges, in contrast, are accustomed to seeing both parties before 
them. And though some judges may be amenable to telephonic or 
satellite testimony, many state judges lack the resources to take 
remote testimony.167 Thus, left-behind parents and their attorneys 
must coordinate to arrange travel to the United States.168 If the left-
behind parent is fortunate enough to be represented by a law firm 
providing pro bono representation, then the firm may cover travel 
expenses;169 if not, the left-behind parent may not be able to afford the 
cost of travel. Additionally, the left-behind parent may face 
immigration barriers that make travel to the United States 
impossible.170 
 
(noting that the United Kingdom provides free legal assistance for return petitions under the 
Convention). 
 164. International Parental Child Abduction: Australia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://
travel.state.gov/abduction/country/country_507.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); International 
Parental Child Abduction: New Zealand, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/country/country_1477.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); International Parental Child 
Abduction: Republic of Ireland, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
country/country_499.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 165. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. 
 166. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 186. 
 167. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. 
 168. KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 91–93 (outlining the logistics of 
arranging travel to the United States for left-behind parents). 
 169. Id. at 92. 
 170. In the author’s experience, it is not uncommon that left-behind parents have previously 
entered the United States illegally and are therefore unable to procure a tourist visa to attend 
the hearing. Furthermore, the Convention does not require that a contracting state admit a left-
behind parent, even if only for the purposes of attending a Convention hearing. Possible 
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2. Specific Challenges Faced by Left-Behind Fathers.  Though all 
left-behind parents face challenges when litigating in the United 
States, left-behind fathers face additional, unique logistical obstacles. 
For example, even when legal aid is potentially available, pro bono 
counsel are frequently disinclined to litigate on behalf of a client 
accused of domestic violence.171 Large, well-resourced law firms that 
routinely consider taking on Convention cases often decline those 
involving domestic-violence allegations because expected public 
relations or marketing benefits might not accrue.172 Moreover, cases 
that involve allegations of domestic violence, if decided in favor of the 
left-behind father, are likely to be appealed—making these cases 
more expensive for, and thus less attractive to, pro bono counsel who 
might otherwise be interested.173 The Office of Children’s Issues at the 
State Department maintains a list of attorneys with experience in 
Convention cases who may be willing to work on a free or reduced-
fee basis,174 but it does not actively place cases with attorneys.175 Thus, 
women who abduct their children into the United States likely enjoy 
a comparative resource advantage, especially given the network of 
agencies that assist women in cases of domestic violence.176 
Further, it is common for abducting parents to devalue the 
importance of the left-behind parent in the child’s life—perhaps even 
more common than for parents locked into a traditional custody 
 
Solutions—Using the Hague Abduction Convention, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel
.state.gov/abduction/solutions/hagueconvention/hagueconvention_3854.html (last visited Jan. 9, 
2011) (“The Convention does not confer any immigration benefit. Anyone seeking to enter the 
United States who is not a United States citizen must fulfill the appropriate entry 
requirements . . . .”). 
 171. Telephone Interview with Stephanie P. Cassano, supra note 155. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Finding an Attorney, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
incoming/legalaid/legalaid_4309.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 175. See 22 C.F.R. § 94.6(e) (2010) (noting that the State Department may “[a]ssist 
applicants in securing information useful for choosing or obtaining legal representation, for 
example, by providing a directory of lawyer referral services, or pro bono listing published by 
legal professional organizations”). 
 176. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. In 
Cullen’s experience, abducting mothers who make accusations of domestic violence are typically 
able to find legal aid “immediately,” whereas left-behind fathers are not able to do so. Id. For 
example, the National Domestic Violence Hotline, in operation twenty-four hours a day, 
provides referrals to agencies in all fifty states for those who allege domestic violence. NAT’L 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
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battle.177 One commentator has even suggested that “a parent, by the 
very act of abduction, is likely to be at significantly increased risk to 
make false and unrealistic allegations that the other parent poses 
potential harm to the child.”178 Whether or not unsubstantiated claims 
are more likely in the abduction context is uncertain;179 what is clear is 
that without legal aid, many left-behind fathers are left to contest 
domestic violence allegations on their own. And if a father loses a 
Convention hearing on domestic-violence grounds, his chances of 
gaining even limited rights during a custody proceeding drop 
precipitously, because whatever obstacles he faced in the Convention 
context will only loom larger in the custody context. For example, 
although obtaining legal aid services may be difficult, a foreign left-
behind father is at least permitted to receive such aid for the purposes 
of a Convention hearing; he is not permitted to receive legal aid 
services, however, for the purposes of a custody proceeding.180 Thus, 
although all foreign left-behind parents face logistical hurdles in 
litigating the Convention cases, fathers confront unique challenges, 
especially when they are accused of domestic violence. 
B.  Gender Stereotyping 
Article 13(b) permits only a restricted inquiry—whether there is 
“specific evidence” of a grave risk of harm to the child upon return.181 
It is not an invitation to consider the broader range of factors relevant 
to a custody determination,182 such as where the child would be 
 
 177. Janet R. Johnston & Linda K. Girdner, Early Identification of Parents at Risk for 
Custody Violations and Prevention of Child Abductions, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 
392, 395 (1998). 
 178. Glen Skoler, A Psychological Critique of International Child Custody and Abduction 
Law, 32 FAM. L.Q. 557, 577 (1998). 
 179. As there is conflicting data on the percentage of domestic-violence allegations that are 
unsubstantiated in custody disputes overall, it would be difficult to demonstrate whether 
unsubstantiated claims are higher in the abduction context. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. 
Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the 
Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 395 n.76 (2008) (citing studies showing disparate percentages of 
unsubstantiated domestic-violence allegations in custody cases). 
 180. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 181. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 182. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006) 
(“The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United States to determine only 
rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”). 
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happiest,183 who would be the better parent,184 or the relative strengths 
of the parental bonds.185 In short, Article 13(b) is “not intended to be 
used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s 
best interests.”186 One reason for this restrictive interpretation is that 
an overly broad interpretation of the grave-risk exception would 
undermine the Convention’s goal of swiftly returning abducted 
children.187 But there is an equally compelling reason to avoid a best-
interests inquiry: determining the child’s best interests threatens to 
invite the type of gender stereotyping prevalent in custody disputes. 
In traditional custody contests, in which the child’s best interests 
are appropriately the focal point, gender biases—real and 
perceived—continue to color outcomes and disfavor fathers.188 Thus, 
if Convention cases begin to consider the child’s best interests 
through a loose interpretation of Article 13(b), as at least one 
contracting state has done189 and some district courts are prone to 
do,190 they too will be affected by gender biases. Left-behind fathers 
accordingly may have to contend with gender bias at two stages: at 
Convention proceedings, if Article 13(b) is interpreted too loosely, 
and again at custody proceedings. Although gender biases are unfair 
to both sexes, left-behind fathers, especially those accused of 
domestic violence, already face unique logistical challenges in 
litigating their cases that may not be present for fleeing mothers.191 
And, unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to squarely reject 
 
 183. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The exception for grave 
harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the 
child would be happiest.”). 
 184. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Courts are not to engage in a 
custody determination or to address such questions as who would be the better parent in the 
long run.”). 
 185. See Richard A. Gardner, Guidelines for Assessing Parental Preference in Child-Custody 
Disputes, 30 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1, 2 (1999) (noting that evaluating the strength of the 
parent-child psychological bond is the heart of a best-interests analysis in a custody dispute). 
 186. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 187. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
4, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98; BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also PÉREZ-
VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 34 (explaining that the exceptions to return “are to be interpreted in a 
restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter”). 
 188. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 189. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 191. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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gender stereotyping in its jurisprudence,192 creating the risk that lower 
courts will rely at least in part upon gender stereotyping as a basis for 
deciding Convention cases. The causal chain is straightforward: an 
unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b) allows for a best-interests 
inquiry, and a best-interests inquiry is often shaped by gender 
stereotypes. If Article 13(b) is not interpreted with care, the 
perception and reality of gender bias that afflict custody 
determinations will also afflict Convention proceedings. 
1. The Judicial Tendency to Conflate Grave Risk with Best 
Interests.  Despite Article 13(b)’s narrow ambit, which demands 
“specific evidence” of a grave risk of harm upon return in order to 
refuse to return a child,193 some courts have broadened their inquiries 
to consider factors relevant to custody and best interests.194 Indeed, 
the risk of launching into a best-interests inquiry looms large enough 
to affect strategic litigation decisions. Convention expert Lawrence 
Katz explains that he always goes to federal court because “[f]ederal 
courts treat cases differently; generally speaking, state courts will turn 
it into a best-interest case.”195 As family and custody issues are the 
province of state law, state court judges are more likely than their 
federal counterparts to see the Convention and custody cases as 
analogous and thus to be drawn into a detailed best-interests 
analysis.196 
Yet the risk of conflating best-interests and grave-risk inquiries 
occurs in federal court as well. In England v. England,197 a mother 
abducted her child from Australia into the United States. The district 
court refused to order the child’s return, finding that returning the 
child to Australia just to determine custody could result in her 
ultimately being sent back to the United States to live with her 
mother, and that “such movement back and forth poses a serious 
threat to her psychological welfare.”198 The district court noted that it 
 
 192. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 193. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 194. See infra text accompanying notes 206–13. 
 195. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Katz, Attorney, Law Offices of Attorney 
Lawrence S. Katz (Nov. 17, 2009). Lawrence Katz is an International Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers fellow and has been litigating Convention cases since 1995. 
 196. See KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 64 (noting that state court judges, as 
opposed to federal judges, “are accustomed to making ‘best interest of the child’ 
determinations”). 
 197. England v. England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 198. Id. at 271. 
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would be difficult for the child “to be separated from her mother or 
have to endure another move so soon after re-settling in Houston.”199 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the potential of being 
shuttled back and forth and its impact on the child was “inapposite” 
because it did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of a grave 
risk of psychological harm.200 
Similarly, in Nuñez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley,201 the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the lower court for expanding its grave-risk inquiry beyond 
permissible bounds. The lower court had based its grave-risk finding 
on the young age of the child and the impact of separating the child 
from his mother.202 The Eighth Circuit found that those considerations 
were irrelevant, because Article 13(b) “only requires an assessment of 
whether the child will face immediate and substantial risk” if returned 
to Mexico pending the custody determination.203 Whatever negative 
impact the separation might occasion, it alone was not sufficient to 
trigger the grave-risk exception.204 
Both England and Nuñez-Escudero demonstrate the tendency of 
some courts to consider how separation from an abducting mother 
during return would affect the child, a tendency that has also surfaced 
in cases of abducting fathers.205 Such inquiries are inappropriate in 
Convention proceedings because they ultimately pertain to custody: 
to consider how the separation would affect the child is to evaluate 
the strength of the parental bond itself—which is the focal point of a 
custody determination based on the child’s best interests.206 In other 
words, whereas reducing the emotional impact of a child’s separation 
from a parent may be a valid consideration in determining a custodial 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Nuñez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 202. Id. at 377. The district court also cited the possibility that the child could be 
institutionalized upon return, but the Eighth Circuit noted that no evidence was submitted to 
support that possibility. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. District courts have lapsed inappropriately into best-interest inquiries when the left-
behind parent is the mother, only to be reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 
505, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the lower court’s refusal to return the child to her mother 
when it had based its decision on judgments about her fitness as a parent and the child’s 
attachment to its father). 
 206. See Gardner, supra note 185, at 2 (noting that the best-interests-of-the-child guideline 
involves “trying to assess . . . which parent has the stronger and healthier psychological bond 
with the child”). 
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arrangement,207 it is largely irrelevant in determining whether there is 
sufficient evidence of grave risk in a Convention proceeding.208 
Moreover, this broadening of Article 13(b) to include questions of 
best interests and custody is not simply legal error; it also invites the 
type of gender stereotyping that characterizes many custody contests. 
2. Historical Gender Bias in Child Custody and Current Gender 
Roles.  Though fathers were given exclusive custody rights to their 
legitimate children early in American history, by the 1920s a 
preference for awarding custody to mothers had become 
widespread.209 This “tender-years doctrine” gave legal imprimatur to 
the belief that mothers were better suited to raise young children than 
were fathers.210 In some states, this presumption continued until the 
mid-1970s.211 Even as other states replaced the tender-years 
presumption with the best-interests-of-the-child test, however, there 
was typically little difference between the two standards in practice.212 
Because society expected little of fathers in raising children, and 
expected much of mothers, it was not surprising that judges generally 
viewed maternal custody as “best” for the child.213 
Today, the best-interests test remains the dominant standard in 
custody cases, despite an acknowledgement that it is more 
aspirational than administrable.214 And though states have tried to 
statutorily define the criteria used to determine best interests,215 
stereotypical gender roles continue to inform the content of the 
 
 207. See Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children’s Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk 
and Resilience Perspectives, 52 FAM. REL. 352, 353 (2003) (noting that visitation arrangements 
that do not take into account the abrupt departure of one parent after divorce and are not 
“attuned to children’s developmental, social, and psychological needs” may increase postdivorce 
stress for children). 
 208. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 n.14 (1st Cir. 2000) (“We disregard the 
arguments that grave risk of harm may be established by the mere fact that removal would 
unsettle the children who have now settled in the United States. That is an inevitable 
consequence of removal.”). 
 209. Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1994, at 
121, 122. 
 210. Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender 
Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 897 (1998). 
 211. Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to 
Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 962 (2005). 
 212. McNeely, supra note 210, at 903. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Bartlett, supra note 74, at 15–16. 
 215. Id. at 16. 
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criteria. Simply put, what is “best” for the child is still implicitly 
defined by the roles that society expects mothers and fathers to play, 
both during and after their relationship. When a relationship ends, 
mothers are expected to be primary caretakers and choose their 
children above all else, or else risk social stigma as failures.216 But, as 
Professor Solangel Maldonado notes, the expectations surrounding 
postdivorce fathers are much more ambiguous: although fathers are 
expected to provide child support, they get mixed messages from 
society and from the law about their proper role in childrearing.217 
Fathers, by and large, are expected to maintain some type of 
visitation schedule with their children, but most forms of visitation 
involve them only minimally in childrearing.218 Thus, a father’s 
postdivorce role is “primarily economic”219 with light childrearing 
duties.220 
This type of gender stereotyping, affecting both mothers and 
fathers, has not been lost on the Supreme Court, which has 
recognized that “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are 
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic 
responsibilities for men.”221 These “mutually reinforcing 
stereotypes”222 shape the content of best-interests inquiries and affect 
the perceptions of all system actors—judges, fathers, mothers, and 
lawyers.223 
3. Gender Bias in Custody Disputes—Real and Perceived.  The 
perception of gender bias in custody disputes and other aspects of 
family law has given impetus to the fathers’ rights movement, which 
 
 216. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 984; see also McNeely, supra note 210, at 901 (“Woe to 
the mother who did not choose to selflessly and altruistically place her children above all else, 
for she would be deemed a failure as a mother, and as a woman.”). 
 217. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 939. 
 218. Id. at 976–77 (describing how many fathers consider even the most generous visitation 
schedules—one weeknight per week, along with alternating weekends and holidays—far from 
sufficient to maintain a parental relationship). 
 219. Id. at 940. 
 220. McNeely, supra note 210, at 914 (noting that the role of the postdivorce father is 
limited to “financial provider and insignificant caretaker”). 
 221. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See generally Maldonado, supra note 211, at 967–75 (describing how stereotypes and 
perceived biases may affect all actors in a custodial dispute). 
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has generated academic commentary,224 activism,225 and a plethora of 
self-help resources dedicated to custody-seeking fathers.226 Many 
fathers’ rights advocates allege that custody laws, informed by an 
underlying belief that men have only a limited role in childrearing, 
are skewed against them.227 The evidence, albeit qualified, 
demonstrates that at least some of their claims are merited. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, over thirty states created task 
forces to research the extent of gender bias in their custody systems.228 
Many states found that, despite neutral custody laws, some judges are 
still influenced by societal beliefs that mothers are better parents than 
fathers.229 Summarizing the voluminous task force studies, one 
researcher concluded that “[t]he majority of states found that courts 
unjustly presume men to be inferior parents to women.”230 The 
remnants of this preference for mothers may very well affect custody 
decisions, as women continue to receive primary residential—that is, 
physical—custody of children in the vast majority of cases.231 
 
 224. See generally THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT: A CALL TO ACTION (Wade F. Horn, 
David Blankenhorn & Mitchell B. Pearlstein eds., 1999) (collecting essays by leaders in the 
fatherhood movement). 
 225. See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 138, at 36–38 (describing the emergence of modern 
fathers’ rights activist groups); FATHERS & FAMILIES, http://www.fathersandfamilies.org (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2011) (noting that the organization “seek[s] better lives for children through 
family court reform”). 
 226. See JULIA LUYSTER, A FATHER’S RIGHT TO CUSTODY (2009) (offering resources and 
support for fathers seeking custody and visitation rights); FATHER’S RIGHTS, 
http://www.fathersrightsinc.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same); FATHERS & DADS FOR 
EQUAL CUSTODY RIGHTS, http://www.fathersrights.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same); 
FATHERS RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.fathers-rights.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same). 
 227. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 967. 
 228. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State 
Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 3 n.1 (1996). 
 229. See Maldonado, supra note 211, at 968. Professor Maldonado calls specific attention to 
both the Massachusetts and Georgia task forces. Id. The Massachusetts task force found that 
“stereotypes about fathers may sometimes affect case outcomes.” Gender Bias Study of the 
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 748 (1990). The Georgia task force 
interviewed many witnesses who testified that judges believe that mothers are better parents 
than fathers are. Ga. Comm’n on Bias in the Judicial Sys., Supreme Court of Ga., Gender and 
Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender 
Bias in the Judicial System, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 658 (1992). 
 230. Swent, supra note 228, at 60. 
 231. See Maldonado, supra note 211, at 966 (noting that “sole residential custody to one 
parent (usually the mother) is still the most common custodial arrangement after divorce”); 
McNeely, supra note 210, at 916 (noting that women receive primary residential custody 90 
percent of the time). 
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Postdivorce fathers are typically granted visitation rights,232 leading to 
sharp differences in the quality and quantity of parenting time.233 
Notably, judges decide only 5 percent of all custody disputes; in 
the remainder of cases, parents voluntarily enter into custody 
agreements without judicial intervention.234 And when parents strike a 
custodial agreement rather than litigate, they overwhelmingly agree 
to award sole physical custody to the mother.235 These statistics are 
striking because when fathers choose to litigate for sole or joint 
physical custody, they are successful more often than not.236 The 
question then remains: why do fathers fail to litigate? 
In answering this question, what may be more relevant than 
actual gender bias is the perception that bias exists. Fathers may feel 
that the system is biased, even when it is not, and therefore may not 
seek custody.237 Attorneys, half of whom believe that the assumption 
that young children belong with their mothers is always or usually 
made in resolving child custody cases,238 may reinforce fathers’ 
perceptions by suggesting to their clients that the chances of 
succeeding are minimal.239 And most pointedly, as Professor 
Maldonado notes, many fathers may have internalized the social 
expectations that fatherhood does not extend beyond economic 
support.240 That is, the same stereotypes that affect judges in custody 
 
 232. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 946. 
 233. It is common for divorced fathers to receive visitation only every other weekend. 
McNeely, supra note 210, at 905 n.87. Even then, this visitation schedule may not translate into 
actual parenting time, as many divorced fathers fail to exercise their visitation rights. 
Maldonado, supra note 211, at 946–47. Further, the time that visiting fathers do spend with their 
children is often dedicated to entertaining them, rather than parenting them. Id. at 948–49. 
 234. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 973. 
 235. Id. at n.259 (citing a study which found that couples agreed to sole maternal custody in 
86 percent of cases). 
 236. Id. at 973–74, 974 n.261. 
 237. See Gender and Justice in the Courts, supra note 229, at 660 (describing the testimony of 
witnesses who stated that fathers were dissuaded from seeking custody because they thought it 
would be futile). 
 238. Douglas Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes Regarding Gender Bias 
in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 208, 212 tbl.1 (2000). The 
perception of gender bias is different among males than among females: 56 percent of male 
attorneys and 34 percent of female attorneys believe that custody awards are made based on the 
presumption that young children belong with their mothers. Id. 
 239. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 974. 
 240. Id. at 974–75. 
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decisions may dissuade fathers from seeking physical custody in the 
first place.241 
Thus, to the extent that Convention proceedings become 
intertwined with custody matters and best-interests inquiries—a 
distinct risk of an unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b)—left-
behind fathers are at a greater risk of gender biases among system 
actors, including themselves, that will make litigating their cases even 
more difficult. 
4. Mixed Messages from the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court 
has spoken out of both sides of its mouth on the matter of gender 
stereotyping. Though the Court has rejected gender stereotyping as 
an administrative proxy, it has, at other times, reinforced a detached, 
highly circumscribed notion of fatherhood. 
In Stanley v. Illinois,242 a father named Peter Stanley had lived 
with his three children intermittently for eighteen years, though he 
had never married their mother.243 When the mother died, the 
children automatically became wards of the state, because state law 
presumed Stanley, an unmarried father, unfit as a parent.244 Stanley—
unlike married, divorced, or widowed fathers—would have to prove 
his parental fitness in a separate proceeding.245 Illinois argued that it 
was permissible to require unmarried fathers to clear this extra legal 
hurdle, because the state was entitled to rely on a presumption of the 
parental unfitness of unmarried fathers.246 The Supreme Court flatly 
rejected this argument. It noted that, although “[p]rocedure by 
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized 
determination,” “the Constitution recognizes higher values than 
speed and efficiency.”247 In other words, even if it were true that most 
 
 241. To claim that the perception of gender bias disadvantages fathers is not to deny that 
gender bias unfairly affects mothers as well. See id. at 970–71 (arguing that women are held to 
higher parenting standards than men when custodial disputes are litigated). The internalization 
of bias or stereotypes has a disproportionate effect on fathers, however, insofar as it discourages 
them from pressing for custody rights. Social expectations for postdivorce mothers create 
pressure for them to seek custody. See supra text accompanying note 216. Conversely, social 
expectations for postdivorce fathers, which minimize their postdivorce childrearing role, create 
no such pressure. See supra text accompanying notes 219–22. 
 242. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 243. Id. at 646. 
 244. Id. at 646–47. 
 245. Id. at 647–48. 
 246. Id. at 653 n.5. 
 247. Id. at 656–57. 
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unwed fathers are unfit, the state could not rely on stereotyping to 
lighten its own administrative burden. In this light, Stanley can be 
read as a clear refutation of gender stereotyping.248 
More recently, however, the Court has embraced gender 
stereotyping. In Nguyen v. INS,249 the Court considered a federal 
statute that distinguished between unmarried citizen fathers and 
unmarried citizen mothers.250 Under the statute, a child born abroad 
to a citizen mother became a citizen at birth, whereas a child born 
abroad to a citizen father had to be legally acknowledged by him 
prior to turning eighteen—or else the child could not claim citizenship 
through the father.251 Nguyen, the twenty-two-year-old son of an 
American soldier in Vietnam, faced deportation as a result of 
criminal charges.252 Though Nguyen had lived with his father in Texas 
since he was six years old, he was at risk of deportation because his 
father had not legally acknowledged his paternity as required by the 
statute.253 
The Court upheld the statute as a valid expression of two 
governmental interests, the second of which directly relates to gender 
stereotyping.254 The Court held that the differential treatment in the 
statute ensured that there was an opportunity for the child to develop 
 
 248. Stanley is not without its critics. Indeed, the Court did not reject the contention of the 
state that unwed fathers were presumably poor parents; it held only that the presumption could 
not be relied upon to alleviate administrative burdens. Id. at 654. And Chief Justice Burger, in 
his dissent, went so far as to embrace the validity of the presumption. Id. at 665–66 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). For a critical view of Stanley and other “core” fatherhood cases, see Nancy E. 
Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 
1271, 1297–1307 (2005). 
 249. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in 
a case related to Nguyen. The petitioner in Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (U.S. 
argued Nov. 10, 2010), challenged the longer residency requirements imposed on unmarried 
American men whose children are born abroad and who seek to pass citizenship onto their 
children. Petitioners did not seek to overrule Nguyen, but to distinguish it. Brief for Petitioner at 
5, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-
10/09-5801_Petitioner.pdf. 
 250. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006). 
 251. Compare id. § 1409(a)(4)(B) (requiring citizen fathers to acknowledge paternity under 
oath prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday), with id. § 1409(c) (imposing no requirement of 
acknowledgment upon citizen mothers). 
 252. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
 253. Id. at 57–58. 
 254. The first governmental interest was assuring that a parent-child relationship in fact 
exists; it is easy to verify the mother’s status, by virtue of her having given birth, but it is harder 
to verify the father’s status. Id. at 66–67. This is a curious holding, as there are ample gender-
neutral ways of affirming parentage. See id. at 80–81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing 
various gender-neutral means of achieving the goals of the statute). 
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a relationship consisting of genuine ties to the parent—and thus to 
the United States—rather than just a formal or legal relationship.255 
The Court explained that mothers, by virtue of giving birth, 
automatically create the opportunity for a “real, meaningful 
relationship” to develop between them and their children.256 For 
fathers, it is a different story: 
The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a 
matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father. 
Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not 
always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor 
is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s 
identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a 
child born overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context 
has always been with young people, men for the most part, who are 
on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.257 
In so holding, the Court relied upon an image of men as detached, 
irresponsible figures, absent from their children’s lives, whereas 
mothers, simply by giving birth, are predisposed to nurture and 
develop a genuine relationship with their children.258 But why does the 
opportunity to develop a genuine relationship not inhere in the father 
as well, if he is present in his child’s life from a young age? Justice 
O’Connor, in a sharp dissent, answered that question: 
There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers who 
are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar 
terms. . . . [T]he goal of a “real, practical relationship” thus finds 
support not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., 
“the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than 
fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their children.”259 
By upholding the statute, the Court aided the concretization of the 
stereotype that fathers are simply less interested in the lives of their 
children.260 This stereotype is similar to that ascribed to postdivorce 
 
 255. Id. at 66–67 (majority opinion). 
 256. Id. at 65. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Dowd, supra note 248, at 1282. 
 259. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 87–89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 
U.S. 420, 482–83 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 260. Once again, the stereotypes are mutually reinforcing. The effect of painting unmarried 
men as detached and distant is to relieve them of all responsibility, placing the responsibility of 
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fathers, whose expected role involves the provision of economic 
support and minimal parental responsibilities.261 
Thus, the message from the Supreme Court has been mixed. In 
its earlier decision, the Court rejected gender stereotypes when 
employed simply to ease administrative burdens. More recently, the 
Court has upheld a facially discriminatory statute by relying on those 
very same gender stereotypes. And when the Supreme Court relies 
on gender stereotypes, it helps to ensure their continued acceptance 
and use by lower courts. If Convention cases veer into best-interests 
inquiries through an overly broad interpretation of Article 13(b), 
judges and lawyers will be tempted to reproduce the Court’s reliance 
on gender stereotypes when litigating and deciding Convention cases. 
C.  Fathers’ Rights in the Domestic Context under the UCCJEA 
Fathers, of course, are not left behind only when mothers cross 
international borders; fathers can also be left behind in the domestic 
context. And interparental violence is a motivating factor in 
abductions between U.S. states as well.262 Although the domestic and 
international contexts are different—the international context poses 
issues of language, culture, and legal training that are absent in the 
domestic context—it is instructive to compare briefly how the 
domestic legal framework handles the rights of left-behind fathers in 
cases of interstate abduction. The domestic framework, more so than 
the Convention, protects the rights of left-behind fathers—suggesting 
that judges should be particularly sensitive to the situation of foreign 
left-behind fathers. These greater protections also suggest that the 
Convention, to the extent possible, should adopt some of the features 
of the domestic legal framework. 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA),263 drafted in 1997 and now adopted by forty-eight 
states,264 governs child abductions and custody disputes between most 
 
nonmarital children entirely upon the shoulders of women. See id. at 92 (noting that placing 
responsibility for nonmarital children on women is “paradigmatic of a historic regime”). 
 261. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
 262. Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect 
Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 101, 101 (2004). 
 263. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997). 
 264. Only Massachusetts and Vermont have yet to adopt the UCCJEA into their state 
codes. See A Few Facts About the Uniform Child Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act, UNIFORM L. 
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American states.265 Key to the UCCJEA is its emphasis on home state 
priority.266 A “home State” is defined as “the state in which a child 
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six 
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a 
child-custody proceeding.”267 As long as the left-behind parent files a 
custody petition in the home state within six months of the abduction, 
the custody case will remain in the home state—thus defeating any 
attempt at forum shopping.268 
The UCCJEA parallels the Convention in many respects. Like 
the Convention, the UCCJEA seeks to avoid the harmful effects on 
children caused by jurisdictional conflict and forum shifting;269 to 
deter child abduction by discouraging the use of the interstate system 
to litigate child custody;270 to promote cooperation among states, 
whereby ultimate custody decisions are rendered by the state best 
positioned to do so;271 and to avoid best-interests-of-the-child inquiries 
by judges in jurisdictions to which the abductor has fled.272 Despite 
these similarities, however, the UCCJEA does a better job of 
protecting the rights of left-behind fathers in two key respects: 
judicial communication and the taking of out-of-state evidence. 
 
COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (listing states that have adopted the UCCJEA). 
 265. Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, UCCJEA: A New Approach to Custody Jurisdiction and 
Interstate Custody and Visitation, 92 ILL. B.J. 204, 204 (2004). 
 266. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201 cmt. 1, 9 
U.L.A. at 672 (describing the provision establishing home-state jurisdiction). 
 267. Id. § 102(7), 9 U.L.A. at 658. 
 268. See id. § 208 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 684 (“Most of the jurisdictional problems generated by 
abducting parents should be solved by the prioritization of home State . . . . For example, if a 
parent takes the child from the home State and seeks an original custody determination 
elsewhere, the stay-at-home parent has six months to file a custody petition under the extended 
home state jurisdictional provision of Section 201, which will ensure that the case is retained in 
the home State.”). 
 269. Id. § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 657. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. The home state under the UCCJEA is analogous, though not identical, to the 
country of habitual residence under the Convention. In both cases, it is presumed that ultimate 
decisions regarding custody are best made in the jurisdiction from which the child was taken. In 
the UCCJEA context, that presumption is expressed through the jurisdictional preferences 
noted previously. In the Convention context, that presumption is expressed through the rule of 
return. 
 272. Id. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 652. (“The UCCJEA eliminates the term ‘best interests’ 
in order to clearly distinguish between the jurisdictional standards and the substantive standards 
relating to custody and visitation of children.”). 
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1. Judicial Communication.  The UCCJEA allows judges in the 
refuge state to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction in the event 
of domestic-violence allegations, thus protecting the fleeing parent 
and the child.273 After exercising such jurisdiction, however, the 
refuge-state judge, if aware that a custody proceeding has already 
been commenced in the home state, must communicate with the 
judge in the home state.274 At the same time, the home-state judge, if 
on notice that a custody proceeding has been commenced in the 
refuge state, must communicate with the refuge-state judge.275 The 
purpose of these mutually obligatory provisions is to protect the 
safety and rights of the parents and the child, and to resolve the 
emergency.276 These provisions are critical in domestic-violence cases 
because they create a “template for communication” that “ensur[es] 
that the courts have input from both parties.”277 
There is enthusiasm for increased judicial communication in 
Convention cases,278 along the lines of what the UCCJEA already 
requires. The Special Commission charged with reviewing the 
operation of the Convention recently reaffirmed its support for direct 
judicial communication,279 an implicit recognition that the UCCJEA is 
a good model to follow.280 Increased transnational communication in 
Convention cases would allow courts to “suggest and produce 
settlements between the parents to facilitate the return process, to 
remove practical obstacles to return, [and] to help to ensure that the 
 
 273. Id. § 204(a), 9 U.L.A. at 676. 
 274. Id. § 204(d), 9 U.L.A. at 677. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Goelman, supra note 262, at 140–41. 
 278. E.g., Special Focus: Direct Judicial Communications on Family Law Matters and the 
Development of Judicial Networks, EC-HCCH Joint Conference, Brussels, 15–16 January 2009, 
JUDGES’ NEWSL. (The Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, the Hague, Neth.), Autumn 
2009, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/news2009.pdf (collecting essays by judges in 
support of and evidencing the use of judicial communication). 
 279. See SPECIAL COMM’N, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW 
THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION OF 19 OCTOBER 1996 ON JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, 
RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PARENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ¶ 1.6.3, at 9 (2006), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/concl28sc5_e.pdf (concluding that contracting states 
should encourage judicial communication). 
 280. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. 
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prompt return may be effected in safe and secure conditions for the 
child.”281 
Although these benefits of judicial communication would 
redound to all parties generally, they would be particularly helpful for 
left-behind fathers. With open judicial communication, judges could 
be more confident that their return orders would ensure the safety of 
the child,282 and accordingly there would be less need for protracted 
proceedings involving allegations under Article 13(b) and less risk 
that judges would impermissibly consider best interests. English 
family-law judge Andrew Moylan has documented his use of judicial 
communication to facilitate returns in cases that involved grave-risk 
allegations,283 and some American judges have indicated their support 
of this approach.284 Ultimately, “[d]irect international judicial 
communications may reduce the number of decisions refusing 
return”—which would benefit left-behind fathers immensely.285 
There are some barriers to judicial communication in the 
international context that do not exist domestically. American judges 
may be hesitant to communicate with their foreign counterparts due 
to differences in language, legal cultures, or individual judicial 
philosophies.286 As a result, there is currently a low level of cross-
border judicial communication in Convention cases.287 Nonetheless, 
increased judicial communication is a goal toward which judges 
should aspire, and from which left-behind fathers would benefit. 
 
 281. Philippe Lortie, Background to the International Hague Network of Judges, reprinted in 
JUDGES’ NEWSL., supra note 278, at 36, 38. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Andrew Moylan, Experience of a Judge from England & Wales, reprinted in JUDGES’ 
NEWSL., supra note 278, at 17, 18–19 (describing a case in which judicial communication 
facilitated a prompt return from England to Malta, even though Article 13(b) allegations were 
raised). 
 284. E.g., Panazatou v. Pantazatos, No. FA 960713571S, 1997 WL 614519, at *3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1997) (indicating the judge’s intention “to arrange a conference call to a 
Judge in Greece similar to conference calls in this country under our Uniform Child Custody 
Act [predecessor to the UCCJEA]” in order to resolve a Convention case in which grave risk of 
psychological harm was alleged under Article 13(b)). 
 285. Lortie, supra note 281, at 36, 38. 
 286. James Garbolino, The Experience of Judges from the United States of America with 
Direct Judicial Communication, reprinted in JUDGES’ NEWSL., supra note 278, at 24, 35. 
 287. Id. at 31. 
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2. Interstate Discovery Provisions.  The UCCJEA also 
encourages and facilitates interstate discovery.288 In the case of 
domestic-violence allegations, for instance, a court that assumes 
jurisdiction may order that the testimony of a witness be taken in 
another state.289 The UCCJEA specifically contemplates the use of 
telephonic or audiovisual testimony, and courts are directed to 
cooperate with one another when choosing the location for taking 
depositions or testimony.290 These provisions are especially 
appropriate in domestic-violence cases, in which the safety of the 
parents or the child might otherwise be in jeopardy.291 At the same 
time, these mechanisms help to ensure that left-behind fathers are 
able to testify and be deposed, thus allowing them to share their side 
of the story. 
These discovery provisions would be welcome in the context of 
the Convention. Foreign left-behind fathers, who may find it difficult 
to travel to the United States for a hearing,292 would be able to testify 
remotely. And American judges, unaccustomed to ruling on the basis 
of affidavits alone,293 might be more likely through remote testimony 
to weigh carefully the interests of the left-behind father and thus feel 
more comfortable returning a child. Just as direct judicial 
communication benefits left-behind fathers by facilitating returns, so 
would increased use of technology for discovery and testimonial 
purposes. 
Despite the UCCJEA provisions, there has been some 
reluctance on the part of judges to use technology to obtain 
information from other states in domestic abduction cases.294 And if 
there is reluctance in the domestic context, in which a framework for 
communication exists, it is likely there would be even more 
reluctance in Convention cases, in which no such framework exists. 
American judges are simply more accustomed to having both parties 
 
 288. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 111, 9 U.L.A. 668 
(1997). 
 289. Id. § 111(a), 9 U.L.A. at 668. 
 290. Id. § 111(b), 9 U.L.A. at 668. 
 291. Id. § 210 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 688. 
 292. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
 294. Goelman, supra note 262, at 142. 
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present in the courtroom, and they may not be comfortable with, or 
may simply lack the resources to conduct, remote testimony.295 
Even if it is not possible to incorporate all of the UCCJEA’s 
provisions regarding judicial communication and interstate discovery 
into the Convention, it is an important model toward which to strive. 
Recent efforts to enhance judicial communication and cooperation 
under the Convention296 are welcome insofar as these measures would 
better protect the rights of left-behind fathers. In the meantime, 
judges assigned to international-abduction cases must be sensitive to 
the disadvantages that foreign left-behind fathers face—
disadvantages that largely do not exist in the domestic context under 
the UCCJEA.297 
CONCLUSION 
Interparental violence motivates, and will continue to motivate, 
cross-border child abductions by fleeing mothers. Article 13(b) of the 
Convention, and specifically the grave-risk-of-psychological-harm 
exception, is the vehicle through which fleeing mothers resist the 
return of their children under the Convention. If courts understand 
and appreciate the well-documented link between exposure to 
domestic violence and psychological harm, Article 13(b) will go a 
 
 295. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. In the author’s experience, some judges are 
reluctant to take remote testimony across international borders—especially telephonic 
testimony—due to difficulties in verifying the identity of the speaker or ensuring that he is 
properly under oath. Other courts may simply lack the resources. See Dionisio Núñez Verdin, 
Future Use of Information Technology for Direct Judicial Communications, reprinted in JUDGES’ 
NEWSL., supra note 278, at 178, 181 (noting that “most courts lack” sufficient technological 
resources for direct judicial communications in child abduction cases). 
 296. See Garbolino, supra note 286, at 24, 31–32 (describing efforts of judges in the last 
decade to use direct judicial communication to resolve cases under the Convention). 
 297. It is true that in some international child abduction cases, attorneys may file under the 
UCCJEA, rather than the Convention, as the UCCJEA treats a child custody order from a 
foreign tribunal like a child custody order from any other state. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 105(a), 9 U.L.A. 662 (1997). But attorneys for left-
behind fathers often have no choice but to file under the Convention. First, to file under the 
UCCJEA, a left-behind father needs a formal child custody order that complies with the 
procedural requirements of the UCCJEA. Conversely, the Convention requires only proof of 
“custody rights”—a much broader standard which can arise under operation of law, not just 
through a formal custody decree. Compare KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 95 
(discussing how a left-behind parent must have an order awarding custody to file under the 
UCCJEA), with id. at 20–22 (discussing how a left-behind parent can have “custody rights” 
under the Convention without a formal decree, sometimes merely by showing proof of 
parentage). Second, petitions under the UCCJEA must be filed in state court, where many 
Convention practitioners are loath to file. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. 
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long way toward protecting victims of domestic violence and their 
children. To enhance this protection, courts that still require a fleeing 
parent to show how the country of habitual residence is unable or 
unwilling to protect the child should abandon this requirement. 
At the same time, it is necessary to understand the precarious 
position of left-behind fathers, whether they are batterers or not. 
Although a Convention hearing does not determine custody, the 
stakes for left-behind fathers are nonetheless high. Many left-behind 
fathers must rely on legal aid in the United States, yet obtaining pro 
bono legal assistance for Convention cases, especially those in which 
there are allegations of domestic violence, is a daunting task. At the 
very least, increased funding for legal aid organizations willing to take 
on such cases—a prospect that Congress has considered but not 
decisively acted upon—is necessary to equalize the playing field. 
Furthermore, although the urge to protect victims of domestic 
violence and their children is wholly understandable, courts must not 
imbue Convention proceedings with the attributes of custody 
disputes, as doing so will allow gender stereotypes to complicate the 
proceedings and further weaken the protection of left-behind fathers’ 
rights. Instead, the Convention should follow the lead of the 
UCCJEA, which does a better job protecting the rights of left-behind 
fathers. 
The Convention can remain both relevant to the modern context 
of domestic violence and fair to left-behind fathers. And although by 
no means a perfect solution, it continues to be the best hope for 
combating the vexing problem of international child abduction. 
